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Comments
Beyond the Third Generation: An Analysis of
Pennsylvania's Latest Attack on Hostile Takeovers
I. -INTRODUCTION
... once again I rise in this Chamber urging my colleagues to support pas-
sage of Senate Bill No. 1310. Senate Bill No. 1310 will significantly curtail
the corporate slash and burn techniques utilized by corporate raiders during
the decade of the '80s. Senate Bill No. 1310 sets new ground rules for the
'90s, providing Pennsylvania boardrooms with the breathing room necessary
to direct their attention to product development and research and global
competition rather than fending off takeovers and paying greenmail.,
Accompanied by an abundance of such rhetoric, Pennsylvania's
newest anti-takeover legislation was overwhelmingly approved by
the General Assembly in the Spring of 1990.2 On April 27, 1990,
the bill was signed into law by Governor Robert P. Casey as Act 36
of the session of 1990.1
Pennsylvania only recently enacted strict anti-takeover provi-
sions4 as part of a complete revision of the Commonwealth's law
governing corporations and unincorporated associations.' This leg-
islation, which took effect in 1988, is similar to the "moratorium
1. Remarks of Senator Wenger to the Pennsylvania Senate on April 23, 1990. See Leg-
islative Journal - Senate, Pennsylvania General Assembly 1947 (April 23, 1990).
2. Senate Bill 1310 was approved by the Senate on April 23, 1990 by a vote of 43 to 6
and by the House of Representatives on April 24, 1990 by a vote of 183 to 17. See History of
Senate and House Bills, Sessions of 1989 and 1990, No 12 (August 30, 1990).
3. 1990 Pa Legis Serv No 2 (Purdon), to be codified at 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 102,
511-12, 1103, 1721, 2502, 2542, 2561-67, 2571-75, 2581-83, 2585-88. All citations to the vari-
ous sections of Act 36 in this comment:will be as they will appear when codified in Purdon's.
4. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2551-56 (Purdon Supp 1990).
5. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 101 et seq (Purdon Supp 1990).
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approach" adopted by Delaware, 6 in that it freezes certain business
transactions between target corporations and hostile bidders for
specified periods of time.7 Thus, Pennsylvania has already shown
an inclination toward deterring hostile takeovers.
Among other things, Act 36 incorporates into the Common-
wealth's anti-takeover statute the Indiana approach, 8 which im-
pedes the acquisition of voting rights by a hostile bidder, and a
truly unique approach, which provides for the disgorgement of
profits following an unsuccessful takeover attempt.9 Pennsylvania
thereby has leaned further towards preventing hostile takeovers by
adopting both the Delaware and Indiana approaches. However, it
is the addition of the unique disgorgement provision which thrusts
Pennsylvania to the forefront of the movement to protect corpora-
tions from hostile takeover attempts.
This comment will examine the various provisions of Act 36 in
detail and analyze their effect on the traditional role and duties of
corporate directors. The Act's impact on the rights and interests of
shareholders and employees of corporations and on the communi-
ties in which corporations do business will also be explored. This
comment will also briefly discuss Act 36 in relation to other states'
anti-takeover statutes and in the context of prior constitutional
challenges to such statutes. The Act will be evaluated in regard to
its effect on the long range economic well-being of the Common-
wealth. Finally, in light of all these issues, an attempt will be made
to decide whether Pennsylvania has gone too far in its efforts to
protect domestic corporations from hostile takeovers, and to ex-
amine the impact of Act 36 in conjunction with the response by
the corporate community to its enactment.
II. A SECTION BY SECTION ANAYLSIS OF ACT 36
Act 36 amends Pennsylvania's corporate law by (1) clarifying the
nature of directors' fiduciary duties,' 0 (2) giving disinterested
shareholders the right to decide whether or not to grant voting
6. 8 Del Code Ann § 203 (1988). For a detailed analysis of Pennsylvania's 1988 anti-
takeover statute and a comparison with the Delaware statute, see Comment, An Analysis of
Pennsylvania's Third Generation Anti-takeover Legislation, 27 Duquesne L Rev 721, 728-
34 (1989).
7. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2555 (Purdon Supp 1990).
8. -Ind Code Ann § 23-1-42-1 (Burns 1989). This legislation is known as the Indiana
Control Share Acquisition Act. Pennsylvania's control-share acquisition provisions will be
codified at 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2561-67.
9. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2571-75.
10. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 511(d)-(f), 1721(e)-(g).
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rights to a bidder attempting to gain control of the corporation,"
(3) allowing the corporation to recover short-swing profits realized
by bidders who put the corporation "in play,"1 (4) providing sev-
erance pay for employees terminated within a specified period of
time before and after a bidder is granted voting rights, 3 and (5)
requiring those who acquire public corporations to assume all labor
contracts existing at the time the bidder is granted voting rights. 4
The amendments to the directors' fiduciary duties apply to all
Pennsylvania corporations, 5 while the other new provisions are ap-
plicable only to "registered corporations."' A corporation may
elect to "opt-out" of the coverage of any one or more of these pro-
visions by adopting a bylaw to that effect by July 26, 1990.17 How-
ever, a corporation can only opt-out of the severance pay and labor
contract provisions if it also opts-out of the control-share acquisi-
tion provision. The decision on whether or not to opt-out by the
date specified is an important one. After July 26, 1990 neither the
board of directors nor the shareholders can opt-out of any of the
provisions of Act 36 unless they reincorporate. This can be an ex-
pensive and time-consuming process which a corporation would
obviously prefer to avoid.
A. The Amendments to Director's Fiduciary Duties
Prior to Act 36, Pennsylvania law already permitted directors to
consider the effect of their actions upon employees, suppliers and
customers of the corporation, upon the communities in which the
corporation conducts business and "all other pertinent factors,"
without violating their fiduciary duties.' 8 Act 36 clarifies in greater
detail the directors' right to look beyond the interests of share-
holders in deciding what is in the best interest of the corporation.
Directors are now expressly authorized to consider the long-term
interests and plans of the corporation and whether these would be
best served by the continued independence of the corporation. 9
11. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2561-67.
12. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2571-75.
13. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2581-83.
14. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2585-88.
15. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 502(a) (Purdon Supp 1990).
16. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2501 (Purdon Supp 1990). Registered corporations in gen-
eral include any corporation that is required to be to be registered with the Securities Ex-
change Commission. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2502 (Purdon Supp 1990).
17. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 1721(0), 2561(b)(2), 2571(b)(2).
18. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 511(b) (Purdon Supp 1990).
19. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 511(d)(2), 1721(e)(3).
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Directors are now also permitted to consider the resources, intent,
and conduct of any person seeking to gain control of the corpora-
tion. 0 Significantly, directors may consider the potential, as well as
the past and stated, resources, intent and conduct of such person.
In delineating the directors' fiduciary duties, the legislature had
previously made no attempt to define the "all other pertinent fac-
tors" which directors may consider. While Act 36 goes no further
in this regard, the Act makes clear that directors are free to assign
whatever weight they deem appropriate to the interests and factors
which are considered." In addition, directors are clearly not re-
quired to pursue any course of action solely because of the effect
their actions would have on an attempt to gain control of the cor-
poration, or on the financial consideration that might be paid to
shareholders as a result of a change of control.22 Finally, Act 36
greatly expands upon the prior law's presumption23 that the direc-
tors' actions are in the best interest of the corporation. The Act
expressly provides that the directors' actions in response to an at-
tempt to gain control of the corporation are to be judged by no
higher a standard than their actions in any other circumstance.24
Furthermore, when an attempt to gain control is involved, any ac-
tion to which a majority of the directors has assented is presumed
to comply with their fiduciary duty, unless there exists clear and
convincing evidence that the directors did not act in good faith,
after a reasonable investigation.
2 5
Prior to Act 36, Pennsylvania law gave generic treatment to di-
rectors' fiduciary duties, with the relevant provisions being appli-
cable under all circumstances. Act 36, on the other hand, deals al-
most exclusively with directors' actions in the context of a hostile
takeover attempt. Arguably, the legislature has granted directors a
"blank check" when a takeover attempt looms on the horizon. Di-
rectors may continue to consider the interests of a host of other
parties, as well as the omnipresent "all other pertinent factors," in
addition to shareholder interests.26 Any action taken in fending off
20. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 511(d)(3), 1721(e)(3).
21. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 511(d)(4), 1721(e)(4).
22. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 511(e), 1721(f)(3).
23. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 511(c) (Purdon Supp 1990).
24. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 511(f), 17 21(g).
25. Id.
26. For a discussion of the trend toward permitting directors to consider non-share-
holder interests, see Roberta S. Karmel, The Duty of Directors-to Non-Shareholder Con-
stituencies in Control Transactions - A Comparison of U.S. and U.K. Law, 25 Wake Forest
L Rev 61 (1990).
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a takeover attempt would necessarily serve some party's interests
and thereby not be violative of the directors' fiduciary duty. Now
directors may also look to the long-term plans of the corporation
and the potential intent and conduct of the hostile bidder. If the
directors justify their actions based on the adverse effects of a hos-
tile bidder's future conduct on the well laid plans of the corpora-
tion, could any argument be made that their actions were not in
good faith or in the best interest of the corporation? Complaining
shareholders would indeed have a difficult task in disputing the
directors' assessment of a bidder's future conduct. The directors'
arsenal of factors and interests is made even more formidable by
the complete freedom to choose which factors and interests are
dominant or controlling. In addition, shareholders will never be
heard to complain that they lost valuable consideration when a
takeover is thwarted, unless they can also point to some other
breach of fiduciary duty. Being already armed with these signifi-
cant obstacles to objections to their actions, the directors are fur-
ther insulated from attack by a "clear and convincing" evidence
standard with regard to any action to which a majority of the di-
rectors have assented. Of course, corporate action can only be au-
thorized by a majority vote of the directors, and individual direc-
tors can do little to impede a takeover. In reality then, any action
taken in response to a takeover attempt will be judged by the
"clear and convincing" standard.
Act 36's treatment of the directors' fiduciary duties begins inno-
cently enough as an application of the traditional "Duty of Loy-
alty" and "Duty of Care" standards.27 However, when the specter
of a hostile takeover attempt arises, the Act quickly surrounds the
directors with a veritable fortress from which to fend off any sub-
sequent suits brought by shareholders on behalf of the
corporation.2
8
27. One portion of the fiduciary standards left unchanged by Act 36 provides that
. a director ... shall perform his duties . . . in good faith, in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interest of the corporation and with such care, including reasona-
ble inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances." 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 511(a) (Purdon Supp 1990).
For a general discussion of the traditional duties of corporate directors, see Harry G.
Henn and John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations, §§ 234-35 at 621-28 (West, 3d ed
1983).
28. For a discussion of other ways in which states are attempting to protect corporate
directors from liability for violating their fiduciary duties in the context of hostile takeovers
see, Dale A. Oesterle, The Effect of Statutes Limiting Directors' Due Care Liability in Hos-
tile Takeover Defenses, 24 Wake Forest L Rev 31 (1989).
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B. The Control-Share Acquisition Provisions
Act 36 adds Subchapter G, entitled "Control-Share Acquisi-
tions,"2 to Chapter 25 of Pennsylvania's Business Corporation
Law3" (hereinafter the "BCL"). With the addition of the control-
share provisions, disinterested shareholders are given the right to
decide whether or not to grant voting rights to a person involved in
a "control-share acquisition." 1 A control-share acquisition occurs
with the acquisition of, or proposal to acquire, over 20%, 33 1/3 %
or 50% of the voting shares of the corporation.2 In addition, the
corporation is not required to present the issue of voting rights to
the shareholders unless the acquiring person (1) delivers to the
corporation a complete information statement, and (2) has entered
into a definitive financial agreement evidencing the necessary fi-
nancial capacity, as determined by the board of directors, to com-
plete the control-share acquisition.3 The information statement
must disclose certain background information of the acquiring per-
son and future plans for the corporation, along with other material
information.3 ' Finally, if the disinterested shareholders fail to
grant voting rights to the acquiring person, the corporation has the
right to repurchase the acquiring person's shares at any time
within two years at the then fair market value.3"
Subchapter G contains several exceptions to its overall opera-
tion, which exceptions generally apply to holders of large blocks of
stock who do not intend to acquire control of the corporation. 6
Also, safe harbors are provided for those who give or hold proxies
for reasons other than influencing control of the corporation, and
for proxies which give the holder only the authority to vote on spe-
cific matters in accordance with the specific instructions of the
shareholder. 7
Unlike those portions of Act 36 dealing with directors' fiduciary
duties, the control-share provisions come into play at the moment
the takeover attempt is initiated and are aimed squarely at the
hostile bidder. As was obviously its intent, Subchapter G presents
29. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §2 2561-67.
30. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 1101 et seq (Purdon Supp 1990).
31. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2563(a).
32. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2562.
33. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2564(d).
34. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2565(a).
35. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2566.
36. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2561.
37. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2562.1.
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formidable obstacles to anyone attempting to change control of the
corporation. The requirement that the acquiring person file an in-
formation statement and financial information, before having the
issue of voting rights submitted to the shareholders, serves to give
the corporation ample notice that a takeover attempt is in the
works. This is certainly a reasonable and fair objective of anti-
takeover legislation. However, the control-share provisions go far
beyond merely exposing a hostile takeover attempt in its early
stages, by giving shareholders the opportunity to ultimately deny
voting rights to the control-shares.
The control-share provisions provide significant incentives for
waging a proxy battle for control of a corporation, as opposed to
the outright acquisition of shares. A majority of the disinterested
shares of the corporation must approve the granting of voting
rights, and any shares which the hostile bidder acquires beneficial
ownership over are no longer disinterested shares. As absurd as it
sounds, a bidder could acquire beneficial ownership of 51% of the
voting shares and still fail to gain control of the corporation when
the remaining shareholders fail to grant voting rights to the con-
trolling shares. Aside from failing to gain control of the corpora-
tion, a bidder who is not granted voting rights may also be faced
with a significant financial loss. Because the corporation has the
right to redeem the control-shares at any time within two years (at
their fair market value), an unsuccessful bidder, who probably paid
a premium for the shares, is at the mercy of the board of directors.
The corporation can redeem the shares at their pleasure, at a point
where the directors feel that the value of the stock has bottomed
out. The resultant financial loss to the unsuccessful bidder should
be an effective deterrent to hostile takeover attempts. (Note that
only in cases where the takeover attempt results in an appreciation
in the value of the shares can such a loss be avoided.) This right of
redemption by the corporation provides an additional disincentive
to commencing a takeover attempt by purchasing shares, as op-
posed to waging a proxy battle.
Subchapter G contributes significantly to the overall objective of
deterring takeover attempts embodied in Act 36. While the Act,
taken as a whole, may arguably operate to the detriment of share-
holders, 38 the control-share provisions provide an ancillary benefit
to shareholders. When a tender offer is made at a premium, share-
holders find themselves in an unenviable position. Although they
38. This issue will be discussed in detail in subsequent portions of this comment.
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are not in favor of the takeover they may be compelled to tender
their shares, rather than being forced to sell them later at a sub-
stantially lower price should the takeover bid succeed. 9 Sub-
chapter G helps avoid this dilemma by giving those who hold their
shares the power to withhold voting rights from the person making
the tender offer.'0
C. The Disgorgement Provisions
Act 36 adds Subchapter H, 1 entitled "Disgorgement by Certain
Controlling Shareholders Following Attempts to Acquire Control,"
to Chapter 25 of the BCL. Subchapter H, as its title indicates, al-
lows the corporation to recover any short-swing profits realized by
the "controlling person."42 A controlling person is a person or
group which (1) acquires, proposes to acquire, or announces an in-
tention to acquire control over 20% or more of the voting shares of
a corporation, or (2) announces an intention to acquire control of
the corporation through any other means.' 3 The profits realized
from the disposition of any shares within eighteen months of at-
taining the status of controlling person are recoverable by the cor-
poration, if the shares are acquired within two years prior to, or
eighteen months subsequent to, attaining such status."
The express purpose of the disgorgement provisions is to protect
the corporation from the manipulative practice of putting the cor-
poration "in play" and from being exposed to paying "green-
mail.' 6 The objective of a person who puts a corporation "in play"
is not to ultimately acquire control of the corporation or to benefit
the corporation in any way, but simply to realize personal financial
gain. This practice is, of course, especially repugnant to lawmakers.
The attempt to put the corporation in play can only succeed if the
bidder acquires control over enough of the voting shares to make
39. See Justice Powell's discussion of the evils of the "two-tier tender offer" in CTS
Corporation v Dynamics Corporation of America, 481 US 69, 82-3 (1987).
40. For a favorable reaction to control-share statutes and a discussion on how they
may benefit shareholders, see Richard A. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes,
86 Mich L Rev 1635, 1681-99 (1988) and Richard A. Booth, State Takeover Statutes Revis-
ited, 88 Mich L Rev 120 (1989).
41. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2571-75.
42. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2574.
43. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2573.
44. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2574(1) & (2).
45. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2572. Greenmail is the name given to the process by which
a corporation pays a hostile bidder a premium for the shares of stock which he has already
acquired, in order to abort the takeover attempt.
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the takeover a real possibility. This may cause the bidder to reach
the 20% threshold, thereby becoming a controlling person. Even if
the threshold is not met, the disclosure requirements of Subsection
G 4 6 will cause the bidder to announce his intention to gain control
of the corporation. Either way, the legislature has effectively pre-
cluded the bidder from realizing any short-term speculative gains.
Like the control-share provisions, the disgorgement provisions
contain several exemptions to their application for holders of large
blocks of stock when no attempt to gain control of the corporation
is involved."7 In addition, these provisions do not apply to proxy
contests that are not part of a scheme to put the corporation "in
play;" nor do they apply to the solicitation of proxies by, or on
behalf of, the corporation.""
The disgorgement provisions should certainly be effective in
achieving their stated objective, especially when considered in rela-
tionship to the control-share provisions. The corporation's right to
recover short-term profits explicitly includes profits realized from
the disposition of shares to the corporation under Subchapter G.' 9
Since the corporation has the right, under Subchapter G, to re-
deem the control shares at any time within two years, the control-
ling person is effectively precluded from simply holding the shares
beyond the eighteen month time limit of Subchapter H and dis-
posing of them at a profit. A bidder who fails to gain voting rights
is completely at the mercy of the corporation. If the value of the
shares, following a failed takeover attempt, is less than what the
bidder paid for them, the corporation can simply redeem the
shares immediately at a loss to the bidder. If the bidder sells the
shares at a profit, the profit is recovered by the corporation. Fi-
nally, even if the bidder holds appreciated shares, the corporation
can redeem them before eighteen months and recover whatever
profit accrues from the sale.
Admittedly, not realizing a profit is a fair and just result for a
corporate raider whose only interest is being paid greenmail. The
problem is that the disgorgement provisions are a blunt instrument
that make no distinctions based on the bidders' motives. The pos-
sibility of serious financial losses seems to be harsh medicine for an
individual who initiates a takeover attempt because of the genuine
belief that the corporation is poorly managed and could profit from
46. See notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
47. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2573.1.
48. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2572(b).
49. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2574.
1991
The Pennsylvania Issue
new leadership.
D. The Severance Pay And Labor Contract Provisions
Subchapter 15 was added to Chapter 25 of the BCL by Act 36.
This subchapter provides for severance pay for employees termi-
nated in the course of a control-share acquisition. 1 In effect, the
BCL now contains a statutory "golden parachute" for employees of
target corporations.5 2 However, unlike severance arrangements cre-
ated by the corporation itself, which are generally limited to upper
echelon employees, Act 36's severance provisions apply to employ-
ees at all levels of the organization.53 To be eligible for the sever-
ance pay, an employee need only be employed within the Com-
monwealth, have at least two years service with the company, and
be employed within ninety days prior to the granting of voting
rights to the control-shares.54 Once eligibility is established, any
employee terminated within ninety days prior to, or two years sub-
sequent to, the granting of voting rights is entitled to a one-time
lump sum severance payment.5 The severance amount is the
weekly compensation of the employee multiplied by the years of
service completed, up to a maximum of twenty-six times the
weekly compensation e.5 In effect then, eligible employees may re-
ceive up to one half of their annual salary.
Subchapter J was also added to Chapter 25 of the BCL by Act
36.51 This subchapter generally provides for the continuation of la-
bor contracts in the event of a "business combination transac-
tion."5 " A business combination transaction is basically any dispo-
sition affecting all, or substantially all, of the corporation's assets.59
Additionally, the labor contract must cover workers engaged in
employment within the Commonwealth and must relate to opera-
50. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2581-83.
51. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2582(a).
52. For a brief discussion, with references to other sources, of "golden parachutes," see
Henn and Alexander, Laws of Corporations, § 254 at 689 (cited in note 27).
53. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2581. Employees are defined simply as "Any person law-
fully employed by an employer." Id.
54. Id.
55. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2582(a). Employees otherwise qualified are entitled to sev-
erance pay unless they are terminated for willful misconduct. Id.
56. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2581. This amount is reduced by payments which the em-
ployer is obligated to make due to the termination, except for payments made under pen-
sion, savings or retirement plans. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2582(a)(2).
57. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann 88 2585-88.
58. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann 8 2587.
59. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann § 2586.
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tions owned by the corporation at the time voting rights were
granted to the control-shares.10
Together, the severance pay and labor contract provisions pro-
vide significant security for employees of target corporations.
Long-term employees may receive substantial severance payments,
and if a labor contract exists, the benefits of such contract cannot
be taken away during its term. The Pennsylvania Legislature is to
be applauded for protecting employees of the Commonwealth from
the arbitrary actions of ruthless corporate raiders who see the
world only in terms of dollar signs, having no regard for the effects
of their actions on corporate employees. While these provisions do
not directly impede takeover attempts, they may provide signifi-
cant financial disincentives. This is especially true if the takeover
bid is motivated by the belief that the profitability of the company
can be improved by reducing or eliminating some of the corpora-
tion's operations and/or being relieved of the contractual obliga-
tions of a labor agreement. By restricting the reduction in expenses
that could otherwise be achieved in the time period immediately
following a takeover, this portion of Act 36 clearly subordinates the
interests of the shareholders to those of the corporation's
employees.0 '
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Pennsylvania's control-share provisions are patterned after the
Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act,6" which was held to be con-
stitutional in CTS Corporation v Dynamics Corporation of
America.63 The Indiana Act was part of a general restructuring of
anti-takeover statutes by state legislatures in response to the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v MITE Corpo-
ration.4 In MITE, the Court invalidated the Illinois Business
Takeover Act on commerce clause grounds;6" a plurality of the
60. Id.
61. Note that both subchapters I and J may eventually be preempted by various fed-
eral statutes. For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Charles R. Volk and Eric N. Athey,
Subchapter I & J of the Pennsylvania Takeover Act of 1990 and Federal Pre-emption,
Pennsylvania Takeover Act of 1990, 178-200 (Pennsylvania Bar Institute No 1990-573).
62. Ind Code Ann § 23-1-42-1 (Burns 1989).
63. 481 US 69 (1987).
64. 457 US 624 (1982).
65. MITE, 457 US at 646. In addition to other qualifying criteria, the Illinois statute
applied to any corporation in which shareholders located in Illinois owned 10% of the stock
subject to a tender offer. Id at 642. The Court held that the burden imposed on interstate
commerce by the regulation of foreign corporations was not outweighed by any legitimate
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Court also concluded that the Williams Act6" preempted the Illi-
nois statute.6 a In Dynamics, the Supreme Court upheld the valid-
ity of the Indiana Act against a federal preemption challenge be-
cause the act contained none of the features of the Illinois Act that
had frustrated the policy of the Williams Act.as In addition, the
Dynamics Court validated the Indiana Act against a commerce
clause challenge because the act applied equally to resident and
foreign bidders and applied only to domestic corporations."a
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Dynamics, the Penn-
sylvania Legislature took a conservative approach in amending the
Commonwealth's anti-takeover legislation. The 1988 version did
not include a "control share acquisition" provision of the type vali-
dated in Dynamics. Instead, Pennsylvania only enacted the "mora-
torium" approach first adopted in New York and Delaware. °
Thus, the legislature declined to join those states which had en-
acted both types of statutes,7 1 so that Pennsylvania was lagging
behind a bit in the anti-takeover race. Act 36 has cured that defi-
ciency with a vengeance. The legislature has now supplied the
missing control share acquisition provisibn, changed the nature of
directors' fiduciary duties so that their conduct during a takeover
attempt is virtually unassailable, and provided for severance pay
and the continuation of labor contracts in the event of a takeover.
Not satisfied with merely being among those states most hostile to
takeover attempts, the lawmakers added the disgorgement provi-
state interest. Id at 643-46.
66. 15 USC §§ 78 m(d)-(e), 78 n(d)-(f) (1982). In general, the Williams Act requires
disclosure of information about a tender offer and establishes procedural rules governing
such offers.
67. MITE, 457 US at 633-40. The plurality decided that the Illinois statute went too
far in enabling corporations to fend off tender offers and thus frustrated the Williams Act's
policy of offeror-management neutrality. The plurality's view of the Williams Act attributes
to Congress the intent place hostile bidders and incumbent management on equal footing.
Id at 635.
68. Dynamics, 481 US at 80-81. The specific provisions of the Illinois statute which
MITE identified as frustrating the policy of the Williams Act were (1) a twenty day period
during which management could present it's position to the shareholders, while the offeror
was denied such access, (2) a stay of any tender offer pending the completion of a hearing
conducted by the Secretary of State, with no set deadline for the completion of the hearing,
and (3) a review of the tender offer by the Secretary of State to determine the fairness of
the offer. MITE, 457 US 624,634-40.
69. Dynamics, 481 US at 87-93.
70. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
71. At the time of the 1988 amendments, Idaho, Nebraska, South Carolina, and Ten-
nessee had adopted a combination of both approaches. See Comment, 27 Duquesne L Rev
at 722, note 9 (cited in note 6).
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sions. An anti-takeover device like none ever seen before,7" the dis-
gorgement provisions make Pennsylvania the undisputed leader in
the anti-takeover movement.7 s
As might be expected with such a unique and restrictive piece of
legislation, the constitutionality of Act 36 is already being chal-
lenged in federal court. The Belzberg family of Canada, whose at-
tempted takeover of Armstrong World Industries sparked the en-
actment of Act 36, T' is challenging the Act's validity in First City
Financial Corporation Ltd. v Armstrong World Industries.7 5 In
addition, shareholders of the company are challenging the Act in
Armstrong World Industries v Adams. 76 These lawsuits allege that
Act 36 violates the commerce clause, the supremacy clause, the
First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and that the
Act constitutes an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment. 7
7
Because of their close similarity to the Indiana Act upheld in
Dynamics, Act 36's control-share provisions should be immune
from either a commerce clause or supremacy clause challenge.
Given the Supreme Court's expansive application of the "internal
affairs" doctrine78 in Dynamics,79 Act 36 should survive the com-
merce clause challenge, even with the addition of the disgorgement
provisions. The supremacy clause challenge may present a more
72. Pennsylvania undoubtedly pioneered the disgorgement approach. However, public-
ity surrounding the enactment of Act 36 allowed at least one other state, that being Ohio, to
enact similar legislation practically unnoticed. See Patty Tascarella, Cast In Concrete, 9
Executive Report 22, 28 (Sept 1990).
73. For a sampling of the numerous publications heralding Pennsylvania's anti-take-
over legislation as the most restrictive in the nation, see Rosalyn Retkwa, States Set Traps
for Corporate Raiders as Investors Protest, 11 Corporate Cashflow 7 (July 1990) and Take-
over Defenses: Fortress Pennsylvania, 24 Mergers and Acquisitions 22 (March/April 1990).
74. For an interesting account of the Belzberg's takeover bid and the political'maneu-
vering behind the passage of Act 36, see Tascarella, 9 Executive Report at 23-7 (cited in
note 72).
75. No. 90-2922 (E D Pa 1990).
76. No. 90-2920 (E D Pa 1990).
77. See Debra Cassens Moss, Anti-Takeover Battle - Armstrong Shareholders, Bidder
File Suit Against Pa. Law, 76 ABA J 24 (July 1990). The pending litigation is also discussed
in Retkwa, 11 Corporate Cashflow 7 (cited in note 73).
78. The internal affairs doctrine, as applied to corporations, holds that the rights and
liabilities of a corporation are determined by the law of the state which has the most signifi-
cant relationship to the subject matter and the parties involved. This is generally the state
of incorporation.
79. Dynamics, 481 US 69, 89-94. In the course of discussing the role of the nation's
stock exchanges in providing the necessary capital for American business, the Court stated:
This beneficial free market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corpora-
tion - except in the rarest situations - is organized under, and governed by, the law of
a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the state of it's incorporation.
Id at 90.
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formidable obstacle to the Act's constitutionality. With the ex-
treme deference now given to directors' conduct in response to at-
tempted takeovers and the addition of the disgorgement provi-
sions, it is difficult to characterize Act 36 as not offending the
federal policy of offeror-management neutrality. However, this in-
terpretation of the Williams Act commanded only a plurality of
the Court in MITE;8 0 and in Dynamics, the Court was less than
enthusiastic in acknowledging the policy of neutrality.8 ' Appar-
ently, the preemptive force of the Williams Act is questionable at
the present time. 2
The First Amendment question arises due to the application of
the control-share provisions to a proxy solicitation. Acquisition of
voting power over shares of the corporation, alone, is sufficient to
constitute a control-share acquisition." A bid to gain control of the
corporation, through the solicitation of proxies, would trigger the
right of the disinterested shareholders to deny voting rights to the
control-shares. The control-shares can only be granted voting
rights by a majority vote of both (1) all the voting shares of the
corporation, and (2) all the disinterested shares of the corpora-
tion.8 " Control-shares not beneficially owned by the acquiring per-
80. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
81. In Dynamics, the Court stated:
As the plurality opinion in MITE did not represent the views of a majority of the
Court, we are not bound by its reasoning. We need not question that reasoning, how-
ever, because we believe the Indiana Act passes muster even under the broad inter-
pretation of the Williams Act articulated by Justice White in MITE.
Dynamics, 481 US at 81 (emphasis added).
The Court went on to emphasize that the Williams Act was designed to protect investors
and that a basic purpose of the Act was to place investors on an equal footing with the
hostile bidder. Id at 82. Thus, the Court seems to be shifting the thrust of the Williams Act
away from management and towards the independent shareholders.
82. In Dynamics, the Court held that the Indiana Act did not favor management in
any significant way. Thus, even under the offeror-management neutrality interpretation of
the Williams Act, the Indiana Act was constitutionally valid. Dynamics, 481 US at 82, n.7.
By characterizing the primary result of the Indiana Act as protecting independent share-
holders, the Court concluded that the Act paralleled the federal policy embodied in the
Williams Act. See note 79. Dynamics, 481 US at 82-3.
It appears that the success of Act 36 in surviving a supremacy clause challenge may well
hinge on (1) whether the federal courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, continue to
distance themselves from Justice White's offeror-management neutrality view and (2)
whether the Act's disgorgement provisions will be characterized as primarily benefitting
management or the independent shareholders. For now, it is worth noting that shareholders
obviously do benefit when the corporation avoids paying greenmail, which is the basic objec-
tive of the disgorgement provisions.
83. 15 Pa Cons Stat Ann §§ 2562, 2563(a)(1) and (2).
84. For readers particularly interested in the constitutional issues involved, the full
text of the complaints filed in both Armstrong cases can be found in Chapter 2, A'pp A,
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son are included in the latter group, but if a majority of this group
refuses to grant voting rights, the proxies become useless. The
traditional right of shareholders to express their wishes and par-
ticipate in the management of the company is thus thwarted. If
proxies are viewed as an essential means by which shareholders
may communicate with each other and express their desires to
management, then perhaps a good argument could be made that
their freedom of speech and association is being violated.
In contrast to the commerce clause and the supremacy clause
arguments raised in Dynamics, the First Amendment is an unt-
ested basis for challenging control-share statutes. The Fifth
Amendment challenge, on the other hand, appears to be directed
at the disgorgement provisions. Because of the uniqueness of the
disgorgement provisions, this type of claim also has no constitu-
tional track record upon which to rely. Speculation as to the out-
come of the First and Fifth Amendment claims, as well as a de-
tailed analysis of all of the constitutional challenges to Act 36, is
beyond the scope of this comment.5 The purpose here is merely to
make the reader aware of the general nature of the plaintiff's
claims and that the Armstrong cases are pending."
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS
If one accepts the premises that some Pennsylvania corporations
are poorly managed and that a mismanaged corporation is not in
the best interest of the corporation's shareholders or employees or
the community in general, then it is difficult to deny the conclu-
sion that a takeover attempt, made with the genuine intent of
making the company more competitive, is a desirable method of
correcting corporate inefficiency. Indeed, a hostile takeover. bid
may be the only plausible way that a poorly managed corporation
is going to change at all. In situations where mismanagement is not
a recent development, the status quo will most likely be main-
tained as long as top management is doing "ok" for themselves. At
Pennsylvania Takeover Act of 1990, 26-92 (Pennsylvania Bar Institute No 1990-573). This
publication also includes discussion of constitutional issues relating to the various subsec-
tions of Act 36.
85. For an article dealing with the constitutional validity of anti-takeover statutes in
general, see Thomas Lee Hazen, State Anti-Takeover Legislation: The Second and Third
Generations, 23 Wake Forest L Rev 77 (1988).
86. It is worth noting that Harvard law professor Laurence Tribe, one of the nation's
premier constitutional scholars, has predicted that Act 36 will be upheld in court. See Moss,
76 ABA J 24 (cited in note 77).
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the other end of the spectrum is a well managed corporation
harassed by the scoundrel who would put the corporation "in
play," purely for his own financial benefit. Ideally, anti-takeover
legislation should deter such a person from any personal gain with-
out unduly burdening takeovers which are beneficial to all con-
cerned (excepting, of course, the incumbent management). Perhaps
it is not possible to deter coercive takeovers without burdening
those that are beneficial. Promoting either of these objectives may
entail at least partially sacrificing the other. If so, how far one goes.
in erecting barriers to corporate takeovers might well depend on
the assumptions one makes about the business world. If one as-
sumes that corporate management is generally honest and compe-
tent and that corporate raiders are unsavory characters, then one
would risk restricting all takeovers in order to avoid the coercion of
corporations. If one takes the opposite view, then one would accept
the risk of some unscrupulous tactics by corporate raiders in order
to avoid perpetuating incompetent management.8"
With the passage of Act 36, the Pennsylvania General Assembly
seems to have adopted the view that corporate management is in-
herently good and corporate raiders inherently bad. However, a
closer examination of the various subsections of the Act seems to
indicate that there are other considerations involved. The disgorge-
ment provisions, by allowing the corporation to recover short-swing
profits, would by themselves effectively deter the practice of put-
ting the corporation "in play," while minimizing the burden im-
posed on legitimate takeover attempts. Why then are the other
subsections of Act 36 necessary? The answer lies in the fact that
the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers
of the corporation are not necessarily co-extensive. In reality, the
shareholder's interests will most often diverge from those of the
other groups.8 8 Corporate decisions that benefit shareholders finan-
cially may cost employees their jobs, leave suppliers without an
outlet for their goods or customers looking for another source of
supply, and have a generally depressing effect on the economy of
87. At least one author has suggested that the market itself will punish the bad take-
overs and reward the good ones, thereby making legislation unnecessary. See Jason Zweig,
Socialism, Pennsylvania Style, 145 Forbes 42 (May 14, 1990).
88. The most typical scenario would involve a mismanaged corporation and a takeover
by a party genuinely concerned with making the company more competitive and profitable.
Toward this end the new managerient may find it desirable to sell-off or eliminate some of
the company's operations or, in the most extreme case, to relocate the corporate headquar-
ters or business enterprises to another state.
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the local community. This is where the other subsections of Act 36
come into play.
The control-share provisions are particularly adapted to thwart-
ing takeovers that may ultimately benefit shareholders but will be
detrimental to non-shareholder interests. The extensive informa-
tional requirements of these provisions will put directors on notice
as to what the hostile bidder's future plans are and provide the
directors with ample time to rally opposition to the takeover. The
shareholders can then stop the attempted takeover dead in its
tracks by refusing to grant voting rights to the control-shares. The
severance pay and labor contract, provisions provide additional
protection specifically 'for employees, while also creating financial
disincentives to a takeover attempt. Finally, the amendments to
the directors' fiduciary duties provide directors with wide latitude
in their conduct in response to. takeover attempts, specifically au-
thorizing them to consider the interests of non-shareholder groups.
Of course, it is entirely reasonable for the Legislature to protect
the interests of the citizens of the Commonwealth in the context of
corporate takeovers.89 As usual, however, there are two sides to
every coin. A certain amount of takeover activity can be desirable,
for weeding out mismanaged companies and ensuring that only the
fit survive. 0 The financial world certainly takes note of this pro-
cess.9' Overly restrictive takeover legislation can result in corpora-
89. There may be a another motive behind the enactment of tough anti-takeover legis-
lation that is less often articulated by the lawmakers. Corporations are obviously a desirable
thing to have located in your state and strict anti-takeover statutes may be considered a
factor in the decision of where to incorporate. After all, it is difficult to imagine a corporate
director or officer that would not welcome the security that legislation such as Act 36
provides.
For an article subscribing to the view that such a motive is behind many anti-takeover
statutes, see Sterling North, States Creating Legislation Aimed at Limiting Corporate
Takeover Activity, 9 New England Business 60 (June 15, 1987). This author suggests that in
their desire to attract corporations, state legislatures have ,been blind. to the benefits of
takeovers.
90. One of the most forceful advocates of this view is T. Boone Pickens, possibly the
nation's premier takeover artist. For Mr. Pickens' views on how takeovers keep corporate
America competitive, see Kathryn M. Welling, The World According to Pickens, 65 Bar-
ron's 8 (Sept. 23, 1985). See also, Marc I. Steinberg, Should the Feds Take Over State
Takeover Laws?, 65 Business and Society Review 54 (Spring 1988), in which the author
laments the ineffectiveness of the Williams Act and implores Congress to preempt state
takeover statutes; and Doug Bandow, Are Hostile Takeovers Good For the Economy?, 63
Business and Society Review 45 (Fall 1987), in which the author answers the question posed
in the title with an emphatic yes.
91. How dramatically financial markets react to restrictions on takeover activity is cer-
tainly debatable. Some analysts do feel that the reaction can be quiie drastic. For example,
see Mark L. Mitchell and Jeffry N. Netter, Triggering the 1987 Stock Market Crash: An-
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tions that are less attractive to investors, thus decreasing the value
of the corporations' stock and inhibiting the investment of capital
within the Commonwealth. e2 Indeed, this was the primary objec-
tion of those few members of the general assembly who opposed
Act 36."
V. CONCLUSION
Whether Pennsylvania has gone too far with the current amend-
ments to the Commonwealth's anti-takeover legislation. has been,
and will undoubtedly continue to be, the subject of much debate.
The conclusion one reaches may differ, depending on whether one
asks this question from an ideological/political point of view or
from a purely economic perspective. From the former perspective,
the issue is clearly a question of whose rights and interests are par-
amount - those of the shareholders or those of non-shareholder
groups.9 4 The obvious answer would appear to be that the share-
titakeover Provisions in the Proposed House Ways and Means Tax Bill?, 24 J of Financial
Economics 37 (Sept 1989). This article suggests that the mere possibility of anti-takeover
legislation may negatively effect the entire stock market.
92. Some of the immediate reaction to Act 36 is noted in Retkwa, 11 Corporate Cash-
flow 7 (cited in note 73), wherein the author indicates that Institutional Shareholder Ser-
vices, an organization which advises institutional investors, planned to ask forty Pennsylva-
nia corporations to either opt-out of Act 36 or incorporate in another state.
For a similar report on the negative reaction to Act 36 by institutional investors, see Cur-
tis Vosti and Marcia Parker, Armstrong in 2 - Front War, 18 Pensions and Investments 2,
32 (March 5, 1990).
It would also appear that strict anti-takeover legislation can have a very immediate ad-
verse effect on shareholders. A study by two Drexel University professors found that stock
prices of large Pennsylvania corporations fell 9% from the time Act 36 was introduced until
it was signed into law, as opposed to a 3% drop in other randomly selected stocks. See Bill
Stieg, Study: Takeover Law Hurts Stocks, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 23 (October 16, 1990).
The author indicates that this study estimates that shareholders of these corporations lost
approximately four billion dollars during this period.
93. In particular, see the remarks of Senator Fumo, Legislative Journal - Senate, 1949-
50 (April 23, 1990). In the course of speaking against Act 36 Senator Fumo read into the
record a letter appearing in the New York Times on April 22, 1990, which read in part:
Pennsylvania has sent a very clear message to investors, whose only logical response
is to avoid the securities of Pennsylvania-based corporations, perhaps their products
and services too.
Legislative Journal - Senate, 1950 (April 23, 1990).
94. This perspective does not imply that all shareholders have a single-minded devo-
tion to maximizing the value of their investments. Many shareholders may also be employ-
ees of the corporation and members of the local community, and be willing to accept less of
a return on their investment in order to advance non-shareholder interests. Even sharehold-
ers who have no other connection with the corporation may be sympathetic to the plight of
employees and the local community, and have no objection to protecting non-shareholder
interests to a degree. The same would probably not be true for institutional investors,
however.
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holders' right to the maximum return on their investment is supe-
rior, being that they are the owners of the corporation. However,
keep in mind that corporations exist as a matter of legislative
grace. The right to incorporate is established by the people, acting
through their elected officials. Absent a constitutional infirmity,
should the citizens of the Commonwealth and their elected repre-
sentatives not be free to proscribe the rules by which corporations
are governed? Since the opportunity to incorporate is created by
the will of the people, is there anything inherently wrong with cor-
porate business being conducted in a manner which benefits em-
ployees, customers and suppliers of the corporation and the com-
munity in general?"
From a purely economic standpoint, shareholder and non-share-
holder interests will likely clash at the outset. 6 However, in the
long run the two groups interests will merge, regardless of the eco-
nomic impact of strict anti-takeover legislation. Although the ef-
fect such legislation has on capital investment most immediately
affects the shareholders by influencing the value of their shares, in
the long term the amount of capital investment also impacts on
economic growth, jobs, and business opportunities for companies
that deal with corporations. 7 From this perspective, the issue is
merely whether or not strict anti-takeover statutes are good for the
economic health of the Commonwealth.
There seems to be little doubt that overly restrictive takeover
laws will ultimately stifle investment." Appropriate anti-takeover
95. For a critical commentary on the notion that corporations must be managed exclu-
sively for the benefit of the shareholders, see Peter Rona, Shareholders Have Too Much
Power, 120 Fortune 125 (August 28, 1989). This author goes so far as to suggest that the
single-minded devotion to increasing shareholder value has been responsible for American
corporations' inability to compete in the international market.
See also, Donald N. Frey, The Social Contract is Threatened, 51 Chief Executive 10
(May/June 1989), in which the author argues that the proliferation of institutional investors
is responsible for the subordination of non-shareholder interests. Because of the resultant
adverse effect on competitiveness, the author views anti-takeover legislation as a regrettable
necessity.
96. See note 88 and accompanying text.
97. Understandably, this is of little concern to persons faced with immediate plant
closings and/or massive lay-offs following a successful hostile takeover. Perhaps, one could
not expect legislators, upon hearing these types of horror stories from their constituents, to
be overly concerned with the potential long-term effects of their actions.
98. In the mid-1980's, at the height of the takeover frenzy, the Federal Reserve Board
was the only federal agency favoring restrictions on takeovers. Among those taking the op-
posite view was The 1985 Economic Report of the President, which contended that hostile
takeovers are good because they increase the value of target corporations. See John
Thackray, The Great Trade Robbery, Management Today 80 (March 1986).
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legislation should, therefore, strive to strike some sort of balance,
taking into account both the immediate conflict between share-
holder and non-shareholder interests and the long-term effects on
everybody's interests. The financial interests of the shareholders
should be protected to the extent the economic vitality of the com-
munities in which corporations operate is not too seriously ef-
fected. In so doing, a balance is also maintained between the Com-
monwealth's immediate economic well-being and securing a sound
economy for the future.
As amended by Act 36, Pennsylvania's anti-takeover legislation
balances nothing. It is absolutely pro-management. For now, it ap-
pears that the future has been sacrificed in the name of the
present.
Regardless of one's opinion of Act 36, there is a development
which has followed the Act's passage which should not escape men-
tion. As of the cut-off date of July 26, 1990, more than sixty pub-
licly-held Pennsylvania companies have opted-out, at least in part,
of Act 36's coverage. 9 Although there exists approximately three
hundred corporations eligible for the Act's protection, those opt-
ing-out have included some of the largest and best known corpora-
tions in the Commonwealth."' Most notable among this group is
Westinghouse Electric, the Commonwealth's largest corporation. 101
Other commentators who suggest that overly restrictive takeover statutes adversely effect
jobs and competitiveness include: Jason Zweig, 145 Forbes 42 (cited in note 87); Marc I.
Steinberg, Federal Preemption of State Antitakeover Statutes: The Time For Congres-
sional Action Is Now, 16 Securities Regulation L J 80 (1988); and Lyman Johnson and
David Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?,
16 Securities Regulation L J 339 (1990). However, Johnson and Millon also take the position
that states should be free to protect the rights of non-shareholders.
See also, the discussion of investors' reactions, to Act 36 in note 92.
99. See Jim McKay, Mixed Response to Anti-takeover Law, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
10 (July 26, 1990). This article also reports that included among those corporations opting-
out is Conrail. This may be particularly embarrassing to supporters of Act 36 because, as
McKay goes on to report, Conrail was used during the debate as an example of a company
that needed protection.
100. See McKay, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette at 10.(cited in note 99). Note that the num-
ber of corporations reported in this article as opting-out is based on the private tabulations
of an attorney who opposed Act 36. The article reports that, because the Act is self-enforc-
ing, there are no official figures, and that generally only those corporations which opt-out
have made announcements. The author indicates that corporations which do not opt-out are
reluctant to publicize their decision due to the wide spread negative reaction to Act 36 by
institutional investors.
101. See McKay, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette at 10 (cited in note 99). The author reports
that Westinghouse feels that the best takeover defense is to be a well-run company. The
article quotes a Westinghouse spokesman as saying: .
The company wants to be judged on its ability to increase shareholder value. By opt-
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The substantial number of corporations which have distanced
themselves from Act 36 raises some disturbing questions. Is anyone
in a better position to judge the desirability of such legislation
than corporate officers and directors themselves? If anyone would
be biased in favor of Act 36, would it not be this group of people?
If corporate officers and directors who stand to benefit significantly
from Act 36 do not want it, was there any need for the Act in the
first place. 10 2 Because there are no official records on how many
corporations have opted-out of Act 36 and corporations are not ob-
ligated to publicize their decisions,'03 such tabulations are not par-
ticularly precise. Although difficult to determine so objectively, it
would seem logical that well-managed corporations have opted-
out, 04 while companies which are poorly managed, and therefore
more vulnerable, have sought the protection of Act 36.105 Some
time must pass before the true impact of Act 36 can accurately be
ing out of the anti-takeover legislation, Westinghouse has put itself in the best posi-
tion to be judged on those merits.
Id at 10.
102. Ironically, by attacking hostile takeovers with such zeal, the Legislature may have
failed, to a large extent to achieve many of Act 36's-desired benefits. With so many corpora-
tions opting-out, a significant portion of both corporations and citizens of the Common-
wealth remain subjected to the onerous effects of bad-faith takeover bids. A well planned,
balanced piece of legislation, with no opt-out provision, would have more effectively
achieved what Act 36 set out to accomplish. Unfortunately, the opportunity has been lost, at
least for now. Of course, the beauty of the legislative process is that nothing is written in
stone and the only certainty is that things can and do change. However, the business climate
of the Commonwealth would be much improved if the legislature would endeavor to find the
right course initially, instead of enacting reactionary legislation and steering wildly between
extremes.
In addition, many observers believe that the era of the hostile takeover has passed with
the collapse of the junk bond market, which fueled much of the takeover frenzy of the
1980's. See Jason Zweig, 145 Forbes 42 (cited. ih note 87). One author has suggested that
".. . maybe, passing a strict anti-takeover law.is not unlike locking the barn door after the
horses all ran away." Tascarella, 9 Executive. Report at 28 (cited in note 72).
103. See note 100. -' 
'
104. See the discussion of Westinghouse Electric's rationale for opting-out in note 100.
105. What has happened at Fischer & Porter Company, a manufacturer of process
control equipment based in Warminster, Pennsylvania, may be informative in this regard.
The company's sales rose by just 2% annually during the 1980's and the return on equity
was never more than 8%. In addition, the company lost two million dollars in the first
quarter of 1990. Less than three years after leaving Pennsylvania and incorporating in Dela-
ware, Jay Tolson, the company's chief executive officer (who also controls over half of the
voting shares), is reincorporating in Pennsylvania. See Jason Zweig, Damn the Sharehold-
ers, Full Speed Astern, 145 Forbes 64 (June 25, 1990).
It-has also been reported that analysts figure that Fischer & Porter Co. is "worth 37%
more dead than alive" and that Mr. Tolson has paid himself more than 10% of the com-
pany's net profits in salary and bonuses. See Tascarella, 9 Executive Report at 23 (cited in
note 72).
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determined. If, in fact, poorly run corporations are generally the
ones remaining within the protective cloak of Act 36, then the Leg-
islature's efforts have caused a rather absurd result. The primary
effect of Act 36 may well be to provide poorly-managed companies
with the means by which to continue to operate in a blissful state
of incompetence.
Michael S. Marshall
